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Abstract 
This paper studies the electricity market design long run problem of ensuring enough generation 
capacity to meet future demand (resource adequacy). Reform processes worldwide have shown that 
it is difficult for the market alone to provide incentives to attract enough investment in capacity 
reserves due to technical and institutional features. We study several measures that have been 
proposed internationally to cope with this problem including strategic reserves, capacity payments, 
capacity requirements, and call options. The analytical and practical strengths and weaknesses of 
each approach are discussed.  
1 Introduction  
The electricity power crises in California, New York, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile and New Zealand in the past few years have dramatically showed the 
importance of a reliable electricity supply.
1
 As of 2000, generation reserves had declined in 
most markets since liberalization.
2
 Average reserves have also decreased in most IEA 
markets except for the UK. An extreme case is Australia where there was significant initial 
overcapacity but reserves drop significantly after the reform. In the cases of UK, Sweden 
and in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland (PJM), reserves in 2000 stayed similar to those 
observed at the time of the original reform, but in Norway there was a decrease of 2% from 
1991 to 2000, and in California a decrease of 7.5% from 1990 to 1998. 
 The change in reserve margins has occurred, in most cases, from a starting point of 
large reserves so that current reserves generally remain above 16%, which seems 
acceptable for reliability purposes. Likewise, several of the examples of electricity crises 
have been in systems that depend heavily upon hydropower. However, there is a growing 
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1
 Reliability in electricity markets is usually understood as the sum of adequacy and security standards. 
Adequacy (security) is generally associated with the long run (short run). Security describes the ability of the 
system to deal with contingencies, while adequacy refers to the ability of the system to meet the aggregate 
consumer energy requirements at all times. Security includes the so called ancillary services (voltage support, 
regulation capacity, spinning reserves, black start capability, etc.). See Singh (2002), and Oren (2003). 
2
 Annex 7.1 presents data on generating reserves for IEA countries 
 2 
concern on whether liberalized markets will be able to provide adequate incentives for 
sufficient investment in generation capacity. This is particularly problematic due to some 
intrinsic characteristics of electricity markets such as: a) a short-term inelastic demand that 
implies that the (long-term) supply-demand balance cannot be achieved through a market-
clearing price; b) a lack of forward electricity markets beyond one or two years; c) the 
favorable arena for strategic behavior due to the difficulty to get market clearing prices in 
tight situations, and d) final consumers do not feel the need to engage in long-term 
contracts because they are usually isolated from spot prices by regulated tariffs.
3
 Likewise, 
markets with particular regulatory policies –implying, for example, price caps and 
artificially elastic consumers-- might require resource adequacy mechanisms to return 
capital to investors in electricity plants.
4
 
 Several measures have been proposed to ensure a sufficient amount of generation 
capacity reserves. As shown in figure 1, such measures might be analyzed in terms of their 
degree of centralization or decentralization with regards to the amount of capacity and the 
price of capacity (see Knops, 2002, and De Vries, 2004). In this paper, we carry out an 
analysis of each one of these measures both studying their theoretical fundaments as well 
as their international application and assessment. 
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3
 See Bouttes (2004), and Vázquez et al (2002). De Vries and Neuhoff (2003) carry out an extensive analysis 
of the market and institutional failures in the electricity industry that impede the development of long-term 
contracts including: lack of generators‟ counter-parties to sign long-term contracts, producers‟ imperfect 
information of the demand function, regulatory uncertainty on whether the regulator will impose price caps in 
periods of price spikes, investment cycles due to long-lead times for new generation facilities, generators‟ 
market power, and so forth. 
4
 Therefore, a market with high price caps would typically not need supply requirements. The question of 
course is with regards to the price cap level that would not cause resource adequacy problems. As discussed 
below, simulations for the PJM market show that price spikes that might occur in an energy only market are 
way above the $1,000 price cap set for PJM, even when combined with an interruptible service policy (see 
Bushnell, 2005). 
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2 Totally Centralized vs. Totally Decentralized Resource Adequacy  
We start analyzing two extreme approaches to resource adequacy and investment in 
capacity reserves. One extreme is a fully centralized solution where a vertically integrated 
utility centrally deals with imbalances and manages congestion and ancillary services using 
its own generation resources. This is the “wheeling” model that is utilized in the United 
States in areas that have not gone into a competitive structure and that have no spot market 
(Hunt, 2002). The Mexican model is another example of centralized supply adequacy 
where private independent power producers (IPPs) sell their energy to the state monopsony 
CFE under long-term power purchase agreements that are supported by government 
funds.
5
 
 Another centralized alternative is the creation of a “moth ball” (or strategic) reserve 
with government subsidy, and centralized decisions regarding both amount and price of 
capacity (see figure 1). The moth ball reserve would imply a strategic reserve of generation 
capacity,
6
 with an operation centrally controlled by the government that would only be 
used during emergencies. There is of course a social cost to this procedure since subsidies 
would be financed through public funds at large. Supply of capacity reserves would then 
be categorized as a public service obligation (Knops, 2002).
7
 
 An opposite extreme approach to resource adequacy is a fully decentralized solution 
where the market determines the amount and price of capacity resource that will grant 
resource adequacy. Under such a solution, the different energy markets would be separated 
and a sequential equilibrium would theoretically be reached in the spot market, the forward 
energy market, the market for capacity reserves, and the forward transmission market 
through the voluntary participation of agents and a minimal supervision of an Independent 
System Operator (ISO) (Wilson, 2002). 
 Different decentralized models have been tried internationally as in Texas, California, 
Australian Victoria pool, and NETA in the United Kingdom.
8
 The aim has been in some 
cases (NETA) to get the system operator out of the spot markets, so that traders manage 
the spot market as well as manage congestion, and separate arrangements are set up for 
ancillary services. Typically, the primary income for recovery of capacity costs is the 
difference between the market clearing price and the generators‟ marginal cost (scarcity 
payments). 
 A basic problem of a decentralized model is precisely that it ends up creating private 
markets not only for spot energy, but also markets for congestion energy, markets for 
imbalance energy, and markets for ancillary services (Hunt, 2002). All these markets deal 
with the same energy product, and in an efficient market all these products would end up 
                                                 
5
 See Carreón-Rodríguez, et al (2006), and Madrigal and de Rosenzweig (2003). 
6
 In Norway and Sweden there is direct ownership of some peaking plants (Güllen, 2000). 
7
 In Mexico, most generation units operate at low factor plants. This could be interpreted as a sort of moth-
ball strategy so that some spare capacity is strategically reserved in the general system. However, the low 
factor plants could also be interpreted as part of CFE‟s monopolistic behaviour. In any case, low factor plants 
does not necessarily have a direct relationship with incentives within the private generation scheme based on 
IPP projects that are bid by the CFE, and that must compulsory sell all their energy to such a public 
monopoly. 
8
 In England and Wales the existing integrated system was substituted with an extreme version of a 
decentralized model that discourages the use of imbalances and trading in markets remote from the system 
operator (New Electricity Trading Arrangements or NETA). According to Hunt (2002), this implies a 
reduction in the transparency of energy markets because imbalance prices do not reflect efficient contract 
prices. 
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being traded at the same price.
9
 In reality, these prices do not converge, and alternatively 
higher prices, shortages, bureaucracy and new transaction costs are created. 
 In fact, wholesale market designs that separate energy and individual ancillary service 
markets have performed poorly and have made electricity markets subject to unilateral 
behavior that leads to price increases (Joskow, 2003). California did an actual separation of 
five electricity markets (Hunt, 2002). Some theoretical studies try to find the optimality 
conditions for such an approach (Wilson, 2002, and Chao and Wilson, 2002). However 
elegant in theory,
 10
 the electricity industry practice has clearly shown the inconvenience of 
separating the different markets. 
 Electricity markets do not fulfill the conditions for full competition to work, so that 
decentralized sequential and efficient equilibrium of the different electricity markets is 
practically impossible (Borenstein, 2002). Market power and volatility are really inherent 
to electricity markets since demand is difficult to forecast and inelastic. Likewise, 
electricity supply faces binding constraints at peak times, and it is inelastic and very costly 
to store.
11
 This implies that short-term prices are extremely volatile so that small changes 
in demand or supply conditions lead to price bursts, and even small-share generators can 
exercise market power. Borenstein then claims that the best way that regulators can handle 
market power is through long-term forward contracts between power buyers and sellers 
together with real-time pricing. Forward contracts help to lower the average price paid in 
both spot and forward markets, while real-time pricing also makes the demand curve 
flatter.
12
 
 Another market-based mechanism for resource adequacy could be based on 
subscription of capacity (Knops, 2002). The desired generation capacity would be 
decentrally determined (see figure 1). When demand approaches supply, every consumer is 
restricted to the peak capacity contracted in advance from generators. Peak capacity can be 
sold by each generator in any amount, and the price for this capacity is left to the market. 
With this solution both the price and the quantity of peak capacity would also be 
decentrally determined.
13
 However, at this moment, such a solution is not technically 
feasible. 
                                                 
9
 This is theoretically confirmed by Carreón-Rodríguez and Rosellón (2005) which show that prices in the 
capacity reserves, peak capacity and non-peak capacity markets converge to the same price in a model that 
separates these three markets. 
10
 For example, Chao and Wilson (2002) analyze the two-part Californian procurement auction for the market 
of spinning reserves. One part of the auction was designed for making capacity available, while the other part 
was for supplying incremental energy. A scoring rule is meant for comparing bids, while a settlement rule is 
used for paying accepted bids. The revelation principle applied to this model makes each supplier‟s optimal-
energy bid reveal his true marginal cost. Additionally, the ISO and the generators are not required to agree on 
the probability distribution of dispatched energy 
11
 This non storable nature of electricity is what mainly differentiates electricity markets from other energy 
markets (such as natural gas and oil). Such a peculiar characteristic of electricity implies a complex system of 
dependent markets (the spot market, the forward energy market, the forward transmission market, and 
offcourse the market for capacity reserves) whose sequential equilibrium is very hard to achieve in practice 
without a centralized ISO. However, the need to regulate electricity markets might as well be driven by 
reluctance from the jurisdiction to pass through wholesale prices into retail rates that are not “politically 
acceptable”. 
12
 Most of the recent electricity reform proposals also promote the use of demand side bidding measures (see, 
for example, Commonwealth of Australia, 2002)  
13
 Carreón-Rodríguez and Rosellón (2005) develop a two-stage oligopolistic model where generators decide 
first if they should enter to the long-term reserves market or the spot market. If they go into the spot market, 
they decide in the second stage to supply either peak or non-peak capacity. Therefore, both amount and price 
 5 
 In the context of an integrated ISO that reaches a centralized equilibrium in all the 
electricity markets, De Vries and Neuhoff (2003) analyze the “energy-only” market 
solution. Such a solution relies on the spot market run by the ISO to take care of resource 
adequacy so that price spikes signal the need of investment in generation capacity. De 
Vries and Neuhoff argue that there are insufficient incentives for generators in an energy-
only market to invest in capacity whenever there exist economic uncertainty or fluctuations 
in demand. Moreover, they show that when generators and consumers are risk averse, the 
optimal level of investment from the perspective of generators is below the level 
consumers wish to finance with long-term contracts. The main reason is that market 
designs do not have the institutions that permit long-term contracts to develop sufficiently, 
and generators are restricted in the amount of risk that they can transfer to consumers. 
Likewise, complete reliance on price spikes is not advisable because they are usually not 
“politically acceptable,” and they can also be manipulated by generation companies. For 
example, if the probability of lost load in the PJM market is 1 day in 10 years, price spikes 
in the range of $12,000-$30,000 per Mwh are needed in an energy-only market. The 
political acceptance of this price range might be analyzed when compared with a $1,000 
regulatory price cap.
14
 Even more, electricity markets that rely on short-term energy 
revenues might lead to shortfalls in capacity over time that might originate investment 
cycles where investment lags demand in the market. This is a characteristic mainly true of 
electricity markets only, due to the sequential equilibrium of such markets and to the non-
storable nature of the electricity good. 
 Regulators worldwide are then very concerned that energy prices are not enough to 
cover generators‟ capacity costs, due to both theoretical and practical reasons. Most 
markets have implemented some type of resource adequacy measure. Texas has recently 
changed to generation adequacy assurances, and FERC‟s Standard Market Design (SMD) 
also recognized the adequate contracted provision of capacity reserves (FERC, 2002).
15
 
California in 2001 also changed its market approach to capacity supply and prompted a 
proposal for an available capacity requirement (ACAP) to be imposed on load serving 
entities (LSEs). 
 It is therefore not surprising that several methods have been formally studied in the 
literature on incentives for investment in reserve capacity such as capacity payments, 
capacity requirements, and capacity options. The literature on resource adequacy analyzes 
these mechanisms in the context of an integrated ISO. We next study such mechanisms. 
                                                                                                                                                    
of long-run capacity reserves and peak capacity are set in the market. Also in a theoretical framework, 
Murphy and Smeers (2002) build a closed-loop Cournot two stage game that describes a situation where 
investments in capacity reserves are decided in a first stage while sales in the spot market occur in a second 
stage. Both stages take place in oligopolistic markets. Their framework does not include forward contracting. 
They find non-convexities in the first stage of the problem (a fact common of bi-level programs) but are able 
to conclude that a model with a spot market has lower prices and higher quantities than a model without a 
spot market. 
14
 Likewise, energy-only markets work in Australia and New Zealand with maximum prices between $2,500 
and $5,000 (Gülen, 2002). 
15
 However FERC has recently backed of and recognized the State‟s jurisdiction over resource adequacy 
measures. 
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3 Capacity Payments 
Capacity payments provide remuneration to generators for making available their 
generation capacity (whether they get dispatched or not). The price of capacity is set while 
the market determines the amount of capacity available. That is, prices are centrally 
determined while capacity decisions are decentralized (see figure 1). Capacity payments 
are collected from consumers through an uplift charge and determine the cost behavior of 
the firm but leave the amount of reserves uncertain. Capacity payments are rooted in the 
theory of peak-load pricing so that energy is priced at marginal cost, and a capacity 
payment is used to recover the fixed capacity cost imposed on peak-period energy users 
(Oren, 2003). The optimality condition is such that the shadow price of the capacity 
constraint is equal to the incremental cost of capacity. 
 Capacity payments have been used in Argentina,
16
 Chile, Colombia, Peru, Spain 
(together with bilateral capacity contracts), and the United Kingdom.
17
 Two different kinds 
of capacity payments have been applied in the international practice: fixed payments and 
fluctuating payments. Fixed per MW payments have been implemented in Spain, where the 
compensation depends on the availability and the technology of the power plant, and in 
Argentina, where the Secretaría de Energía set a $10 MWH ($5 for base capacity and $5 
for reliability) payment paid during peak demand blocks (6am-11pm during workdays).  
 Fluctuating payments vary with the need for reserved capacity. Although later 
rescinded under NETA, they were implemented in the early UK (England and Wales) 
electricity market. The market merit-order pricing rule was modified during periods of 
high demand when reserve capacity margins were low. In such circumstance, the market 
price was defined as the weighted average of two factors: the price of the last accepted 
offer to generate (LAO) and the value of lost load (VOLL). The weight is the LOLP. The 
formula for the market price is then market price = LAO * (1-LOLP) + VOLL * LOLP, 
where: 0  LOLP  1. The greater (lower) the surplus reserve capacity the smaller (higher) 
is LOLP. Generators would ideally add capacity when the expected sum of all these 
payments over all hours of the year is greater than the cost of installing new capacity. This 
formula also implies a price cap for VOLL when the system is short of power. 
 A general assessment of capacity payments is that they do not always favor 
competition because they tend to create artificial rents that might lead to increased market 
power in generation. In a simple Cournot model, Carreón-Rodríguez and Rosellón (2005) 
find the conditions under which a fluctuating capacity payment (as the one put in practice 
in the UK) might lead to worse results in terms of consumer surplus, profits and net social 
benefits compared to a system where the market price is not artificially increased and 
excess demand is satisfied in a regulated reserve (or standby) market.
18
 They show that 
implementation of a bypass reserve market makes social sense in terms of prices only if 
there is a large efficiency gap between old and new generation plants. In such a case, the 
implementation of the capacity-payment solution would only create artificially high rents 
that could provide incentives for a development of oligopolistic generation markets.
19
 
                                                 
16
 Argentina changed to a capacity market in 2000. 
17
 With the adoption of “NETA” in October 2000, the UK abandoned capacity payments based on the loss of 
load probability (LOLP) method along with the pool system. 
18
 A similar approach to a standby market was applied in Victoria, Australia, with obligations to ensure 
capacity in an energy-only market. 
19
 The mathematical derivation of these results is presented in annexes 7.2 through 7.4. See also Barzalobre 
(2000). 
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 In a similar effort, Joskow and Tirole (2004) analyze the effects of an uplift charge of 
an ISO to recover the costs of resources. They do so in the context of a general model that 
studies the effects on the theorems of welfare economics of market failures as those 
existing in electricity markets. They find that capacity payments grant inefficient results: 
 When the uplift charge is applied both to peak and off-peak periods, large ISO 
purchases discourage the build up of base load capacity and push down the peak 
price. 
 For small purchases, off-peak capacity decreases when the uplift is applied in 
both peak and off peak periods, and the peak capacity decreases when the uplift 
is only applied during the peak period. 
 In a model of imperfect information, Oren and Sioshansi (2003) analyze payments for 
reserve capacity in a joint day-ahead energy and reserves auction. Reserves are procured 
through the energy market using energy only bids, and capacity payments are made based 
on the generator‟s opportunity cost. The revelation principle is applied to show that 
generators have an incentive to understate their costs so as to capture higher capacity 
rents.
20
 
 Such theoretical assessments are confirmed in practice by the case of Argentina that 
substituted its fixed capacity payment mechanism for a hybrid system of payments and 
contracts because fixed payments were found to distort the merit order dispatch, and 
negatively affected the long-term financial situation of thermal generators. In the UK, the 
LOLP system was manipulated by large players at the end of the pre-NETA period.
21
 In 
several other countries, capacity payments have also led to construction of inefficient 
peaking units, promote the use of one fuel over others, and eliminated the incentive for 
availability during crisis of deficit supply. 
 Likewise, as in any price-cap procedure, setting the optimal level of capacity 
payments is very difficult (Singh, 2002). In Great Britain, during the pre-NETA period, the 
calculation of the LOLP suffered several flaws that overestimated the probability of losing 
load,
22
 and underestimated the VOLL. This was a political strategic choice to provide 
generators with a constant flow of revenues so that capacity payments made investments in 
power plants easier. In Australia, VOLL was substantially increased to make peaking 
capacity commercial. 
 A practical problem of fluctuating capacity payments is that variations in such 
mechanism happen in the short run, whereas the relevant time for investment in capacity 
reserves is the long term (Knops, 2002). Additionally, the LOLP method is not adequate 
for largely hydro-based systems (as Brazil) as the LOLP would be very small during wet 
seasons, which would lead to disproportionate low revenues for thermal generators (Gülen, 
2002). Therefore, any capacity adder should be designed to reflect the value of the plant to 
the system, which is in turn affected by the technology plant composition in such a system 
(Hunt, 2002). 
                                                 
20
 See also Newbery (1995). 
21
 See Green (2004).  
22
 Capacity actually available and dispatched at peak times was therefore underestimated, which in turn 
facilitated gaming behaviour by generators. Other flaws included: the calculation of LOLP used average 
availability (ignoring that plants are typically fully available at peak times but less available off peak), and 
the LOLP software looked at absolute (rather than relative) differences between generation and demand even 
during the summer and as on a winter peak. VOLL was underestimated in part because a generic VOLL was 
used for all consumers (Roques et al, 2004). 
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 Capacity payments might be combined with price caps to protect consumers because 
when capacity is paid separately, there is no need that price spikes remunerate reserve 
capacity (IEA, 2002). The result of such combination could be a reduction in price 
volatility without affecting average prices and reserves (Hobbs et al, 2002). However, price 
caps can also have a locational influence on generators that would seek high price-cap 
areas. 
 Notwithstanding its inconveniences, many sources believe that a capacity payment 
system --together with an ISO pool design-- is superior to the new NETA system for the 
UK at least with regards to resource adequacy. Such a combination “…is close to the 
Standard Market Design (SMD) recommendations of the FERC, which Hunt (2002) 
considers as the „clear market design winner‟” (Roques et al, 2004). Likewise, a 
comparative study carried out by the Council of Australian Governments in order to 
evaluate the Australian national electricity market concluded that their capacity payment 
system fares well when compared to market designs in PJM, Nordpool, and (especially) 
NETA (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). 
4 Capacity Requirements 
Capacity requirements are set as an obligation to maintain a certain amount of reserve 
capacity. Such an amount is centrally determined through an administratively forecast of 
demand, and is usually imposed by the ISO (or the regulator) to LSEs. Conversely to 
capacity payments, the price is decentrally determined by the market once the amount of 
reserve capacity is set (see figure 1). LSEs must buy enough “capacity tickets” to meet the 
expected peak load of their customers multiplied by (1+X), where X is the expected 
reserve margin that will cover an estimated level of reliability to cope with random 
outages. The tickets are sold by generators who are usually allowed to export their reserve 
capacity to other markets. With a capacity requirement, the regulator is able to control the 
reserve level but the cost remains uncertain (IEA, 2002) 
 Capacity requirements are used in PJM, New York and New England markets where 
an obligation is imposed on LSEs to arrange for Installed Capacity (ICAP). In particular, 
PJM put into practice a bid-based, day-ahead and month-ahead ICAP markets.
23
 LSEs are 
required to buy ICAP in order to be able to serve loads, and they can trade their ICAP with 
other LSEs. The ICAP requirements can be met by LSEs through self supply, bilateral 
transactions with suppliers, capability period auctions (several–month strip), monthly 
auctions, deficiency-spot market auctions, and so forth. Capacity resources can be exported 
from (or imported to) the PJM area. Generators sell a recall right that enables PJM to recall 
energy exports from capacity resources when required. When capacity is recalled, the 
supplier is paid the market price for energy. The system operator determines demand 
through the choice of obligations of LSEs, which must own or purchase capacity resources 
greater than or equal to their expected peak-load plus a reserve margin. If an LSE is short 
of capacity, it pays a penalty that equals the daily amount of deficiency in capacity times 
                                                 
23
 On October 1, 1998, PJM initiated monthly and multi-monthly capacity markets, while daily capacity 
markets initiated their operation in 1999. 
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the number of days. When the system itself is short of capacity, the deficiency charge is the 
double of the capacity deficiency rate (equal to USD 174.73 per MW-day in 2003).
24
 
  Long-term reserves can also be viewed as price insurance and be treated as a 
private good but within the framework of a centralized provision of the ISO that imposes 
mandatory levels of such insurance on LSEs (Oren, 2003). These mandatory rules would 
compensate for several obstacles that consumers face when choosing an adequate level of 
protection, such as technological barriers on metering control, political barriers to set 
electricity tariffs efficiently, and so forth. 
 For a market base on operating reserves backed by high prices, Stoft (2002) shows 
that optimal investment in generation capacity depends on the inverse relationship between 
capacity requirements and the purchase price limit on the system operator: the higher the 
reserve requirement the lower the optimal price limit.
25
 
  A theoretical analysis of the PJM-ICAP market is provided in Creti and Fabra 
(2004). They build a two-stage game theory model. In the first stage, prior to the 
realization of demand, generators compete in the capacity market and receive their 
payments for the capacity amounts they commit. In the second stage, once demand is 
realized, generators compete in the domestic and foreign markets. When there is excess 
demand, the regulator recalls the suppliers‟ committed capacity resources, which are paid 
at market prices. Finally, suppliers get their payments for the energy sold.  
 Creti and Fabra analyze this game for the monopoly and the perfect competition 
cases, and also study the role of the regulator in choosing the capacity requirement as well 
as in setting a capacity price cap. Creti and Fabra derive several results from their model 
on: 
1. The opportunity costs of committing capacity resources.  
2. The firm‟s optimal behavior in the capacity market.  
3. The regulator optimal decisions regarding capacity price caps and the optimal 
reserve requirement.  
 In a first result, they show the trade-off that a generator faces between committing 
more resources to the capacity market against the foregone revenues from exports (in the 
case of being recalled). The difference between the foreign and domestic prices then 
determines the opportunity cost of committing capacity resources.
26
 The second result 
shows that two types of equilibria are possible for the firm‟s optimal behavior given the 
value of the capacity price cap, and the reserve requirement set by the regulator. When the 
price cap is too “low”, the generator‟s opportunity costs will not be covered and a capacity 
deficit would arise (capacity deficit equilibrium). When the price cap is “high” enough 
capacity resources are able to cover the needed capacity requirement (market clearing 
equilibrium).
27
 Finally, Creti and Fabra show that the regulator should always set the 
                                                 
24
 The capacity deficiency rate indicates the annual fixed cost of a combustion turbine in PJM plus 
transmission costs (PJM, 2003). 
25
 Stoft (2002) also shows that in a perfectly competitive market a price cap equal to the average value of lost 
load results in an optimal level of investment in generation capacity. Ford (1999), and Hobbs et al. (2001) 
also discuss the need for price caps when markets do not clear.  
26
 More specifically, the opportunity cost is also a function of the probability of recall, the amount of 
resources needed by the system to assure resource adequacy, and the intensity of price competition in the 
energy market. 
27
 Joskow and Tirole (2004) also build a model that shows how a combination of capacity requirements with 
capacity price caps might potentially restore investment incentives. Even in the presence of market power, a 
 10 
capacity requirement equal to peak demand so as to fully avoid the risk of shortage, and to 
set the capacity price cap equal to the firm‟s opportunity costs of providing full capacity 
commitment. 
 Creti and Fabra‟s results show the fragility of the ICAP system, which crucially 
depends on the capacity price cap, and the capacity requirement. The administrative 
calculation of the latter variable is a subjective one,
28
 while the optimality of the former 
variable depends on the market structure of financial transmission rights (FTRs) since the 
opportunity cost of the generator is given by the price difference between the domestic and 
foreign markets: if the FTR is subject to market power that will be reflected in the ICAP 
market. 
 In practice, ICAP mechanisms have generally failed to provide investment signals 
when they are most needed. ICAP markets were subject to market manipulation
29
 that 
caused price spikes in 2000 in PJM. The pool was deficient some days in June, July and 
August 2000 since owners of capacity increased their exports for periods when external 
prices surpassed the PJM market price. In January 2001, there were price spikes of more 
than $300 MW-day with a deficiency in system capacity. Furthermore, high market 
concentration in capacity ownership has also been observed. 
 For New England, Joskow (2003) showed that the scarcity rents generated were far 
below from what would be necessary to attract reserve “peaking” capacity to invest (or 
continue operation) so as to supply the needed operating reserves and energy during 
scarcity conditions. The average scarcity rents in New England of $10,000 Mw-Year are 
very low compared to the fixed cost of a new combustion turbine built to provide reserve 
capacity estimated in between $60,000-$80,000 Mw-year. This means that the combination 
of an ISO spot market with ICAP markets has not been capable to provide enough 
incentives to attract generating capacity to maintain adequate reliability levels. Similar 
results have been obtained for the New York ISO (Patton, 2002). 
 The ICAP system is usually flawed in part because it derives from short-term 
adequacy concerns rather than long-term, and since it depends on a subjective estimation 
of a “right” capacity level which depends on generation stocks, fuel prices, load shapes, 
and elasticity of demand for reserves. Also, since ICAP is combined with the possibility of 
exportation of capacity, the value of the ICAP depends on the price differences across the 
adjacent markets. Furthermore, ICAPs have not provided incentives to build new 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Ramsey) optimum can be achieved when: (i) LSE capacity requirements can be met both by peak and base 
load generators, (ii) capacity requirements are determined using the demand from all consumers, and the 
capacity prices reflect the prices paid by all retail consumers, and (iii) the market for peaking capacity is 
contestable. However, this result is not true when there are more than three states of nature (where two state 
of nature are “off-peak” and “peak”). In such a case, strict price-cap regulation might be used to alleviate 
market power off-peak and allow peakers to recover their investment (Joskow and Tirole, 2004, pp. 45-46). 
28
 There have been efforts to improve the calculation of the capacity requirement. For example, in the New 
York ISO a demand curve was proposed to be constructed as an alternative to an ICAP market. The intention 
was to increase resource reliability by valuing additional ICAP above the fixed capacity requirement 
(Harvard Electricity Policy Group, 2003). 
29
 ICAP gives incentives in the short run for manipulating the availability of plants to increase revenue.  
Anticompetitive behavior is potentially higher when capacity and system constraints are binding. Such 
effects are magnified by the typical high inelasticity of both the supply and demand curves of electricity 
markets. Another practical problem of ICAP is the interaction among systems with and without capacity 
requirements, which might lead to inefficient distortions (IEA, 2002). 
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generation facilities and, conversely, have contributed to keep old inefficient plants in 
place (Harvard Electricity Policy Group, 2003).
30
 
 FERC‟s original SMD also criticized ICAP requirements and proposed instead the 
use of resource adequacy requirements with targeted curtailments, penalties for 
undercontracting, and long-term contracting mandatory measures (FERC, 2002). This is a 
further flawed policy because there is no objective way to solve the resource-adequacy 
problem in accordance with SMD without incurring the many difficult issues faced in 
ICAP design (Chandley and Hogan, 2002). A preferred solution would be to allow prices 
to clear the energy and reserve markets (so that scarcity costs are properly signaled)
31
 
while allowing financial hedging contracts and demand-side measures. According to 
Chandley and Hogan, FERC should not mandate the replacement of ICAP mechanism 
while totally discourage a market-clearing alternative for reserve capacity markets. 
 PJM has then been looking to modify its ICAP system by developing a new 
methodology for peak load obligation, and by changing the month-ahead and day-ahead 
markets to a price-taker auction while retaining mandatory participation in the day-ahead 
market. Likewise, the ISO New England proposed a new locational installed capacity 
(LICAP) market since the capacity markets in New England were registering at certain 
times  prices of zero while generation in constrained areas needed to be valued more highly 
(Davis, 2004).
32
 The initial plan was to extend the day-ahead and real-time markets to 
include reserve availability bids. However, a primary difficulty was that the marginal cost 
of providing reserves in such markets was negligible (Cramton et al, 2005). The LICAP 
proposal included basing prices in demand curves for Maine, Connecticut, metropolitan 
Boston, and the rest of New England. New prices are to be phased-in through capped 
increments in a five-year period. These proposals were initially opposed by LSEs and other 
consumers since –in their opinion-- they would only produce huge transfers from LSEs to 
generators, without providing long-term incentives to increase new generation (Davis, 
2004). However, the New England ISO abandoned the original idea of extending the day-
ahead and real-time markets to include reserves, and proposed instead to price reserves in 
real time during shortages (shortage pricing) together with enhancing the forward reserve 
market for offline reserves.
33
 The LICAP market and the forward reserve market then work 
as complements. LICAP rewards flexible resources, while the forward market provides 
compensations (based on locational prices) to reserve resources so that price reflects the 
economics costs of reserving supply. 
                                                 
30
 Joskow and Tirole (2004) theoretically show that the inefficient dispatch of resources procured by the ISO 
in order to be used during reserve scarcity conditions will lead in the long run to substitution of base load 
units by peak units. 
31
 This is of course confronted with the political motivation to keep prices low. However, from a strictly 
economic point of view, the experience in industries different from the electricity industry is that “the best 
cure for high prices is high prices” (Harvard Electricity Policy Group, 2003, p.18). 
32
 Creti and Fabra (2004) deduce from their theoretical model the possibility that capacity markets clear at 
zero prices if there is no spread between national and foreign prices. 
33
 Real time shortage prices are determined for each type of reserves according to a penalty factor. A bonus is 
paid for most reserves for being available when most needed. Meanwhile, the forward reserve market works 
according to auctions of offline reserves.  
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5 Call Options 
As seen in the previous section, capacity requirements have the problem of artificially 
setting a capacity level and the value of maintaining such a capacity. Call options are 
proposed as an alternative system that would represent a more real value of capacity, and 
that bundles generation adequacy with price insurance (Vázquez et al, 2002). The desired 
capacity is centrally determined, while price is decentrally determined but consumers are 
hedged against huge price spikes (see figure 1). Typically, the system operator would 
purchase call options from the generators in a competitive bidding process that would 
cover the desired capacity.
34
 The buyer exercises the option if the spot price is greater than 
the strike price (and receives a premium equal to the difference between the spot price and 
the strike price).
35
 The strike price of options is used as a price-cap in case of emergencies, 
and high penalties are imposed for failure to deliver when the option is called. This assures 
that the promised capacity is really made available, especially during the peak periods. 
 The price cap of a call options system works as a protection to consumers, which will 
assure that prices stay within a socially acceptable range so that the regulatory intervention 
becomes a form of insurance against price volatility. Compared to the ICAP system, the 
risk is now changed to the system operator (or the LSE) that now bears the uncertainty of 
whether the options are used or not. Risk is removed from generators that now face a more 
stable revenue horizon compared to an uncertain and volatile income for peak generation. 
The expected generators income for prices above the strike price equals the price of the call 
options, and generators now receive a fixed payment for the option. Prices and 
corresponding capacity payments are then derived as market based premia from the market 
players‟ strategies for risk management. 
  The provision of supply adequacy through LSE‟s hedging obligations captures 
several important features (Oren, 2003). If the LSE obligations are adjusted (say) monthly 
to reflect fluctuations in forecasted peak demand, a secondary market for call options 
should emerge that would permit the trading of options among LSEs. However, while 
secondary markets permit the LSEs to adjust their positions each month, price volatility in 
such markets increases the LSEs risk. Hedging should then be treated as another ancillary 
service, allowing LSEs self provision through bilateral contracts with the ISO act as a 
provider of last resort. The danger is of course that this may interfere with incentives in the 
contract market, and be perceived by LSEs as an alternative to prudent risk management. 
 In countries lacking well-developed financial markets, LSEs or generators may 
assume more risk than they can handle reliably.
36
 In particular, LSEs might not be able to 
manage risk in a socially optimal way, so that the regulator should need to set a minimum 
contracting or hedging level on LSEs. Then again, this would lead to non-market 
arbitrariness.  
                                                 
34
 Alternatively, LSEs could be the buyers of options through self-provision from their own controlled 
resources, or through bilateral contracts with generators. 
35
 The strike price of a call option is the contractual price at which the underlier (i.e. the value(s) from which 
a derivative derives its value) will be purchased in the event that the option is exercised. The buyers of the 
call option may choose the strike price that suits their risk aversion: high (low) strike prices have small (high) 
premiums. Option premiums also work as substitute efficient signals compared to price signals generated by 
ICAPs (Singh, 2002). 
36
 Likewise, the capital market might not be able to provide the long term financing for generation 
investments commensurate to the associated risk. This combined with inexperience with commodity trading 
in the electricity industry --and the perceived regulatory risk-- might raise the cost of capital so much that the 
investment level will be far below than the needed for an efficient resource adequacy level (Oren, 2003).  
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 A call-option mechanism has been designed for the electricity market in Colombia 
(Vázquez et al, 2002). The regulator requires the system operator to buy a prescribed 
volume of reliability contracts that allow consumers to get a market compatible price cap 
in exchange for a fixed capacity remuneration for generators. This entitles consumers to 
enough available generation capacity. Reliability contracts then consist of a combination of 
a financial call option with a high strike price, and an explicit penalty for generators in case 
of non-delivery.
37
 The regulator carries out a yearly auction of option contracts and sets the 
strike price (at least 25% above the variable cost of the most expensive generator) and the 
volume of capacity to be auctioned (in terms of the expected peak demand and the 
available installed capacity). However, generators decide how to divide their total capacity 
into different blocks (firm, less-firm, new entrants, and least-firm) and how to price each 
block, so that capacity assigned to each generator is a market result and not the outcome of 
an administrative process. This proposal is very sensitive to market power. Therefore, its 
implementation requires that the maximum amount that a generator can bid is limited to its 
nominal capacity, that portfolio bidding is not allowed, and that the winning bids cannot 
transfer their obligations of physical delivery to other generators. 
6 Concluding remarks 
This paper has surveyed the contributions to the literature on supply adequacy in electricity 
markets. We studied the different existing approaches, and described their analytical 
properties and implementation characteristics. In assessing the different alternatives, the 
trend in the literature is to look for some kind of transitory regulatory intervention that 
grants resource adequacy. Capacity obligations or capacity payments can mainly be useful 
if hourly metering, hourly pricing, and demand bidding are inadequate, and cannot be 
implemented expeditiously. Otherwise, many believe that the energy and the reserve 
markets should not be separated (Hunt, 2002). The ideal would then be an ISO (which runs 
day-ahead and spot markets) that takes care of imbalances and reaches equilibrium of all 
electricity markets in an integrated way. Market players would meet their long run 
expectations for the demand-supply balance in well-developed forward and futures 
markets. Energy and reserve pricing would take care of supply adequacy. This last 
approach relies on the view that capacity mechanisms are designed for electricity markets 
that miss a fundamental central issue: if regulators set the type, level and location of 
capacity levels and payments there will not be much left for markets to do. All that would 
be left is competitive procurement, very much like what is done through traditional 
regulation. 
 In practice, however, electricity markets are usually implemented together with 
transitory resource-adequacy measures, but capacity payments and requirements alone 
have been found to present several inconveniences both in theory and practice. In the case 
of capacity payments, Argentina abandoned them because they negatively affected the 
financial situation of generators, while they were manipulated by large players in the UK. 
In several other countries, they led to create inefficient peaking plants, artificially 
promoted the use of a certain fuel, and distorted the structure of production incentives 
                                                 
37
 When the market price p is greater than the strike price s, and the generator is unable to honor its obligation 
to produce, the generator will have to pay an additional penalty pen (apart from the difference p–s). The 
additional penalty is intended to discourage even more bids not backed by reliable capacity. 
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during crisis of deficit supply. Additionally, experience has shown that the calculation of 
the level of capacity payments does not follow the long run logic needed for investments in 
capacity reserves. Likewise, it is a subjective task that could be susceptible to political 
manipulation, and that very much depends on the technological plant composition. 
Notwithstanding its inconveniences, the capacity payment system combined with a pool 
design has shown to provide better incentives in the UK and Australia for investments in 
generation reserves compared to NETA, PJM and Nordpool.  
 With regards to capacity requirement mechanisms, practice has shown that they do 
not provide adequate investment signals, and that they have been subject to market 
manipulation, have not promoted the building of new generation facilities, and have led to 
inefficient distortions when they interact with systems without capacity requirements. In 
PJM, for example, they led to several price spikes when owners of capacity increased their 
exports as external prices surpassed the PJM market prices. In New York, the ICAP system 
was not able to generate incentives to attract generating capacity that guaranteed resource 
adequacy because scarcity rents were too low compared to the cost of building peaking 
capacity. The LICAP proposal for New England was originally opposed for its lack of 
long-term incentives to increase capacity reserves, and because it represented a rent 
transfer from LSEs to generators. Even FERC proposed resource adequacy requirements 
based on long-term contracting measures. Similar to capacity payments, capacity 
requirement mechanisms are usually derived from short-term adequacy concerns rather 
than long-term, and the calculation of an optimal capacity level is subjective as well. 
 However, the ISO New England has recently proposed capacity reserve market that 
more or less combines capacity requirements and payments, as well as forward markets. 
The original proposal of extending the day-ahead and real-time markets to include reserves 
was abandoned. The new proposal is to price reserves in real time during shortages 
together with developing a forward reserve market for offline reserves. The LICAP market 
and the forward reserve are then combined in such a way that LICAP rewards flexible 
resources, while the forward market remunerates offline reserve resources. This is an 
interesting proposal that seems to extract the virtues of both the capacity requirement and 
capacity payment methods. 
 The most advanced developments in the literature point to the use of an alternative 
system based on some type of hedging instruments such as call options. Capacity payments 
or requirements would work efficiently when combined with risk management approaches 
and hedging instruments that promote demand side participation. Regulatory intervention 
would then be focused on promoting rules that facilitate liquid markets for energy futures 
and risk management. In any case, even tough some see resource adequacy requirements as 
artificial policies that suppress market signals and retard market development, they could 
also be understood as positive measures that, if effective, could prevent governments from 
severely costly policy reversals (as the costly policy reversals in California and Ontario) 
that could occur in the absence of any supply requirement.  
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7 Annex 
7.1 Reserve Margins in IEA Countries 
 
Figure 2 
Reserve Margin in IEA Countries 1985-1999 
 
(1) Portugal, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands not included. 
(2) Australia not included. 
Source: IEA 
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Table 1 
Reserve Margins in IEA Countries (%) 
 
  
1985 1990 1995 1999 
Australia 36 28 … 21* 
Austria … 61(2) 60 54(3) 
Belgium 38 26 21 18 
Canada  26 19 24 … 
Denmark  36 36 46 49 
Finland 22 23 22 23 
France 31 39 38 37 
Germany 27 25 28 29 
Greece 42 42 32 31 
Hungary 6 9 23 26 
Ireland 34 32 24 14 
Italy 45(1) 36 40 42 
Japan 35 27 26 33 
Luxembourg 54 … … … 
Netherlands 43 39 41 26(3) 
New Zealand 37 29 34 29 
Norway 27 37 28 27 
Portugal … … 52 57 
Spain 46 39 44 39 
Sweden 27 36 27 23 
Switzerland 47 42 42 33 
Turkey 40 46 36 34 
United 
Kingdom 
21 26 21 23 
United States 30 26 20 16 
(1) 1986 data.,(2) 1991 data, (3) 1998 data, (*) Missing data. 
                     Source: IEA 
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Figure 3 
Reserve Margins in Selected Power Markets 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 In PJM, there is approximately 5 per cent interruptible demand which has been included in the reserve margin 
calculation, for comparative purposes. 
 VIC means Victoria, Australia. 
Source: IEA 
Table 2 
Change in Reserve Margins in the Reformed Markets 
  
UK Norway Sweden 
Australia Australia US: US: 
  Victoria N.S. California PJM 
    Wales     
Change in 
0 -2 0 -24 -13 1 0 
reserve 
margin since 
year of 
liberalization 
until year 
2000 
Change in 
5 -3 -5 -16(2) -7 7,5 -3(3) 
average 
reserve 
margin (1) 
Year of 
1990 1991 1996 1994 1997 1998 1998 
liberalization 
(1) Difference between average reserves in the five years before liberalization and average reserves from year of 
liberalization to year 2000.  
(2) Average four years before liberalization in 1994. 
(3) Average three years before liberalization in 1998. 
Source IEA 
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7.2 The Capacity Payment Model 
Let us first study a simple stylized version a capacity-payment model. Assume that the 
inverse demand function at a peak period has the form: 
 
)1()1()()( kbQkaQPQP      (1) 
 
where )(QP  is the inverse demand function, Q  is the amount of electricity generated, 
0a  and 0b  are positive constants, and 0k  is a factor added to the price of 
electricity during peak periods.
38
  We assume there are only two firms, firm 1  and firm 2 . 
We then have 21 qqQ   (where 1q  and 2q  are the amounts of electricity generated by 
firm 1  and firm 2 , respectively).  
The cost functions are 
 
iiii qcqc )(   for 2,1i    (2) 
 
where ic  is the marginal cost of power generation for firm 2,1i .  Suppose that 21 cc  .  
The profit maximization problem for firm 2,1i  is then 
 
   
iiiji
q
i
q
qcqqqkbka
ii
 )])(1()1([maxmax   (3) 
 
 The optimal quantities of a Cournot duopoly, and the market price that solve problem 
(3) are 
 
)1(3
2)1(
*
kb
ccka
q
ij
i


  for 2,1i    (4) 
 
3
)1(
)()(
21** ccka
QPQP

    (5) 
 
 Given these optimal values, profits for firm 2,1i  are 
 
)1(9
2)1(
2
kb
ccka ij
i


     (6) 
 
 Therefore, the net social benefit (equal to the sum of total profits plus total consumer 
surplus) is  
 
ECNSB 
21
 
     
)1(18
36)1(8)1(8 212121
22
kb
cccckaccka


           (7) 
 
                                                 
38
 k would therefore contain terms such as “cfalla” and “k factor” of the 1999 Mexican reform proposal (see 
Carreón-Rodríguez and Rosellón, 2002). 
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Note that that this expression is mainly determined by the value of k  (the term that 
artificially increases the price of electricity), and the marginal costs of each firm. 
7.3 The Regulated Standby Model 
Let us now formally analyze the regulated standby model in which excess demand is 
satisfied in a reserve (or standby) market. Now firm 1 is a monopoly in the pool market, 
while firm 2 is also a monopoly operating in the reserve market. Firm 2 only takes care of 
excess demand. 
 Firm 1‟s inverse demand function is given by 
 
11
ˆˆˆ)ˆ(ˆ qbaqp      (8) 
and its cost function is 
111
ˆˆ)ˆ( qcqc       (9) 
 
 The profit maximization problem of firm 1 is then: 
 
   1111
qˆ
1
qˆ
ˆˆˆ)ˆˆˆ(ˆ   
11
qcqqbamaxmax    (10) 
 
 In this case, the equilibrium quantity and price are  
b
ca
q
ˆ2
ˆˆ
ˆ 1
1

      (11) 
2
ˆˆ
)ˆ(ˆ
1
1
* ca
qp

     (12) 
 Then, profits are 
 
b
ca
4
2
1
1

     (13) 
 
 Firm 2 only operates to satisfy excess demand at peak periods. This firm faces an 
inverse demand function of the form: 
 
)1(ˆˆ)ˆ1(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ 22 kqbkaqpqp     (14) 
and its cost function is 
222
ˆˆ)ˆ(ˆ qcqc       (15) 
 
 Firm 2‟s profit maximization problem is 
 
    22222
q
2
q
ˆˆˆ)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ  ˆ
22
qcqqpqpmaxmax     (16) 
 
 In this case, the equilibrium quantity and the equilibrium price are 
)ˆ1(ˆ2
ˆ)ˆ1(ˆ
ˆ 2
*
2
kb
cka
q


     (17) 
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2
ˆ)ˆ1(ˆ
)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ
2
2
*
2
* cka
qpqp

    (18) 
 Then, profits are 
 
)1(4
)1(
2
2
2
kb
cka


    (19) 
 
 Hence, the net social benefit in the standby model is 
 
   
)1(8
)1(3)1(3
2
2
2
1
kb
ckacak
NSB


               (20) 
 
 Now, assuming 
21
 cc   (firms in the pool are more efficient than the firms in the 
reserve market), we get 
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7.4 Comparison of the Capacity Payment and Standby Models 
Once we have obtained the equilibrium values for quantities, prices, profits, consumer 
surplus and net social benefits in both models, it is possible to compare under what 
conditions one policy is superior to the other. For this purpose, we will assume that 
generators in the capacity-payment and the standby models face the same cost and demand 
functions, that is 
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 We carry out the comparison both at the firm level, and at the social level. Total 
profits under the standby model are greater than total profits under the capacity-payment 
model if 
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while consumer surplus in the standby model is greater than consumer surplus under the 
capacity-payment model if 
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 Given that 
21
 cc  , it is evident from these equations that profits, consumer surplus 
and net social benefits are greater under the standby model than under the “capacity 
payment” model the greater is the value of  12 cc  . That is, the standby model provides 
better social and private outcomes for economies where the marginal cost difference 
between modern and old plants is large enough. 
 Moreover, both models can also be compared in terms of implied electricity prices. 
According to (22), the equilibrium reserve-market price in the standby model is greater 
than the corresponding spot price. However, what is the relation between the former price 
and the equilibrium price of the capacity-payment model? It can be shown that  
 
)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ   )()(
2
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2
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21
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21
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qpqpqqpqqp        (25) 
 
whenever the difference  12 cc   is sufficiently large. That is, implementation of a bypass 
reserve market makes social sense in terms of prices only if there is a large efficiency gap 
between old and new generation plants. In such a case, the implementation of the capacity-
payment solution would only create an artificially high rent that could provide incentives 
for development of oligopoly generation markets. 
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